Actually Here

Selby Labs Pty Ltd

Privacy Policy

Version 1.0 Effective 20 August 2026 Governing law Victoria, Australia Applies to Actually Here

The short version

Actually Here is built so that the people who run it cannot read what it carries. Class data is encrypted on the phone that creates it, under a key that only the teaching staff's devices ever hold. Our server stores and serves those encrypted lines without any means of opening them.

The rest of this document says all of that precisely, including the parts that are less flattering.

1Who we are

Actually Here is operated by Selby Labs Pty Ltd (ABN 50 697 107 083), a company incorporated in Victoria, Australia, with its registered office at Suite 329/98-100 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne VIC 3000.

Actually Here is a classroom attendance app for iOS and Android. An instructor creates a class; students join it with a class code; check-ins are proven cryptographically rather than confirmed by hand. This policy covers the mobile apps, the relay server they talk to, and this website.

2The law we work under

We are committed to protecting personal information and to complying with applicable privacy law, in particular:

Where these are inconsistent, the more protective provision applies.

3How the design decides the privacy

Most of this policy follows from three facts about how the app is built, so they are worth stating before the lists.

The class key never leaves the teaching staff's devices

When an instructor creates a class, their phone generates a class key. Every event in that class (a student joining, a session opening, a check-in, a manual mark) is encrypted to that key before it leaves the device. Staff receive the key by having it wrapped to their own public key when they are promoted. It is never uploaded, never escrowed, and we hold no copy. If every staff device in a class is lost, that class's contents are unrecoverable, by us or by anyone.

Signing keys are generated in device hardware and cannot be exported

Each device generates its own signing keypair inside the Secure Enclave (iOS) or Android Keystore/StrongBox. The private key cannot be read out by the app, by us, or by anyone with the phone in their hand. We only ever see public key material, and only inside encrypted lines we cannot open.

Nobody has an account

There is no sign-up, no password and no email address anywhere in the product. Creating a class returns an opaque access token to the device that created it; joining a class returns another. The server knows those tokens only as one-way hashes, and knows nothing about the person holding one.

4What we hold on the server

This is the complete inventory. There is no other store, no database, and no analytics pipeline behind it.

What Contents Retention
The class log Encrypted lines, numbered in the order they arrived. Each is a sealed box we have no key for. We never parse them. Life of the class
The membership list Per class: a one-way SHA-256 hash of each access token, mapped to a random membership identifier, a role, and a creation timestamp. No name, no number, no contact detail. Life of the class
The class code The short code students type to join, mapped to a class identifier, plus the class's public key. Life of the class
Subscription records A hash of the App Store or Google Play transaction identifier, the platform, the classes it unlocks, and an expiry date. Purchases happen inside the stores; we never receive a name, an address or a payment instrument. Life of the subscription
Access logs One line per request: timestamp, source IP address, method, path, status code and duration. The Authorization header is never written, so the log cannot be joined to a membership. 7 days, then deleted
The honest residual. An IP address is personal information under Australian and European law, and as a relay we necessarily see one on every request. We keep it for seven days for abuse prevention and diagnostics, we never store it next to a token, and we delete it on schedule. That is the one place where the app's privacy rests on our practice rather than on the mathematics.

5What never reaches us

The following are not withheld by policy. They are absent from the protocol, so there is no version of our server that could log them:

6What stays on your own device

Most of what people would call "your data" lives on your phone and nowhere else:

Deleting the app deletes all of it. Leaving a class removes your membership from our server and wipes the class from your phone. Neither action can retract lines already appended to a class log, which is what makes an attendance record an attendance record; but nothing in that log identifies you to us.

7Who is responsible for class data

The instructor who creates a class, and the institution they teach for, decide what the class is for, who is in it and what happens to the attendance record afterwards. Under the Privacy Act and under GDPR they are the controller of that information.

Selby Labs stores and transmits that information as a service provider, a processor, and does so entirely in encrypted form. We do not decide how a class's data is used, we do not use it for our own purposes, and we could not do either if we tried.

If you are a student wanting to see, correct or remove your attendance record, ask the instructor who runs the class. They can read it; we cannot. See section 11.

8Where the data lives

Actually Here runs on one server, in Amazon Web Services' Asia Pacific (Sydney) region, ap-southeast-2. There is no second region, no replica in another country, and no content delivery network in front of it: your phone connects to that server directly. This website is hosted separately and carries no class data.

Because the server holds no identifying information about students or instructors, hosting it in Australia does not involve any cross-border disclosure of personal information about people outside Australia beyond the IP addresses described in section 4.

9Third parties

We do not sell, rent or share personal information. The complete list of outside parties involved in running the service:

Who Why Where
Amazon Web Services Hosting: one virtual machine with encrypted storage volumes Australia (ap-southeast-2)
Apple The App Store handles subscription purchases. Our server verifies Apple's signed transaction entirely offline; nothing is sent to Apple by us. Per Apple
Google Google Play handles subscription purchases on Android. To confirm an expiry date our server queries the Play Developer API with the purchase token only. Per Google
Cloudflare Authoritative DNS for our domain names, and hosting for this website only (Cloudflare Pages). Your browser's IP address is visible to Cloudflare when a page here loads. It is not a proxy for the app's server, which your phone reaches directly. Global edge
Let's Encrypt Issues the TLS certificate for our domain name. Sees the domain name, nothing else. United States
Google Fonts Serves the two web fonts used by this website only. Your browser's IP address is visible to Google when a page here loads. The apps do not use it. Per Google

We may disclose information where required by law, court order or lawful request from a government authority. What could be produced under such an order is what section 4 describes: ciphertext we cannot decrypt, token hashes, and up to seven days of access logs. We would have no way to comply with a request for the contents of a class.

If Selby Labs were acquired or merged, this information would transfer with the business, subject to protections no less protective than those set out here.

10Retention and deletion

Deletion is real, which means it is final. There is no backup we could restore a deleted class from, and no key that would let us read it if there were. Export the roll before deleting a class you may still need.

11Your rights, and the honest limits of them

Under the Australian Privacy Principles you may ask for access to, and correction of, personal information we hold about you. Where GDPR applies you additionally have rights of erasure, restriction, portability and objection.

Those rights run into a design fact worth stating plainly: we usually cannot find "your" data, because nothing in our store is linked to you. A request naming a person cannot be matched against token hashes and ciphertext. In practice:

Where the Privacy Act permits us to decline a request we cannot fulfil, we will say so and explain why rather than leave it unanswered. Requests go to the address in section 14; we respond within 30 days.

12Children

Actually Here is designed for tertiary teaching and is not directed at children. Where an institution chooses to use it with students under the age of consent in their jurisdiction, that institution is responsible for obtaining any consent required and for deciding whether the tool is appropriate. The app collects nothing from a student beyond the name and number they type, and that never leaves their phone in readable form.

13Data breaches

We comply with the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme under the Privacy Act 1988. If we become aware of a breach affecting information covered by this policy, we will assess it promptly and notify affected instructors, and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, where the scheme requires it, and in any event within 72 hours of becoming aware, so that institutions can meet their own obligations.

Because class contents are encrypted end-to-end, a compromise of our server would expose ciphertext, token hashes and recent access logs. We will describe honestly what was and was not exposed rather than reassure in general terms.

14Changes to this policy

We may update this policy. The version number and effective date at the top always identify the current one, and the current version is published on this page. Where a change materially reduces the protections described here, we will say so prominently rather than quietly reissue the document.

Contact

Selby Labs Pty Ltd · ABN 50 697 107 083

Suite 329/98-100 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne VIC 3000, Australia

Email: actuallyhere@selbylabs.com

If you are not satisfied with our response, you may contact the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner at oaic.gov.au or on 1300 363 992.